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ABSTRACT
This article presents the application of choice-based conjoint 
analysis to analyse the attitude of Thai government organisations 
towards the restriction of the contractor’s right to claim 
compensation for unfavourable effects from undesirable events. 
The analysis reveals that the organisations want to restrict only 6 
out of 14 types of the claiming rights that were studied. The right 
that they want to restrict most is the right to claim for additional 
direct costs due to force majeure. They are willing to pay between 
0.087% - 0.210% of the total project direct cost for restricting each 
type of contractor right. The total additional cost for restricting 
all six types of rights that the organisations are willing to pay is 
0.882%. The last section of this article applies the knowledge 
gained from a choice based conjoint analysis experiment to the 
analysis of the standard contract of the Thai government. The 
analysis reveals three types of rights where Thai government 
organisations are willing to forego restrictions, but the present 
standard contract does not grant such rights.
Keywords:  choice-based conjoint analysis, attitude, claim, 
willingness to pay, Thailand.
INTRODUCTION
Several unpredictable events occurring during the construction 
period may have unfavourable effects on construction duration 
and the contractor’s expense. Some examples of these events 
are force majeures, employer’s ineffective functions, employer’s 
interference actions, different site conditions, and change in 
scope of work. Research has revealed that these events are 
often cited as reasons for claims for compensation. Moreover, the 
claims due to these events very often initiate confl ict and disputes 
between contracting parties (Diekmann and Nelson, 1985; Semple 
et al., 1994; Kumaraswamy 1997; Yogeswaran et al.,1998; 
Kumaraswamy 1998a; Kumaraswamy 1998b; Zaneldin, 2005).
One of the most effective ways to prevent confl icts between 
contracting parties due to these undesirable events is to let 
them know, at the very beginning of the project, the types of 
unfavourable effects that contractors have the right to claim 
for compensation and the types of unfavourable events that 
contractors cannot claim by writing contract conditions to cover 
these issues clearly and completely. One has to be very careful 
when drafting these contract conditions. Inappropriate granting 
or restricting the contractor’s claiming right can cause problems 
to contracting parties. For example, if the contract restricts the 
contractor’s right to claim compensation for an unfavourable effect 
that the employer is willing to bear himself, the employer may be 
charged an unacceptably high risk premium by the contractor. 
Moreover, the contractor may have a feeling that the employer 
is taking advantage of him when there is an inappropriate 
restriction of his claiming right. As a result the relationship between 
contracting parties can turn sour. On the other hand, granting the 
contractor’s right to claim compensation for any unfavourable 
effect that the employer is not willing to bear himself can also 
cause problems to the employer in managing and handling this 
unallocated risk (Ashley et al., 1989; Jergeas and Hartman, 1996; 
Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; Mohamed and Hartman, 2000; 
ACEC/AGC, 2005).
It is important to obtain data on the attitudes of employers and 
of contractors towards the restriction of the contractor’s right to 
claim for compensation as well as data on the risk premium that 
the employers are willing to pay and that the contractors require. 
These data are necessary for considering whether each type of the 
contractor’s right to claim for compensation should be restricted 
or granted by contract. Having data on the attitude of employers 
and of contractors towards the restriction of the contractor’s right 
allows one to determine which type of right should or should 
not be restricted. The contract absolutely should not restrict the 
contractor’s claiming right if the employer does not want to restrict 
it. In other words, the type of effect that the employer does not 
think the contractor should be responsible for should be assigned 
to the employer. There is no reason to assign this responsibility 
to the contractor if the employer is comfortable in taking the 
responsibility. Moreover, the restriction of the contractor’s right 
to claim compensation for this effect will cost the employer an 
unnecessary extra expense (Ashley et al., 1989; Jergeas and 
Hartman, 1996; Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; Mohamed and 
Hartman, 2000). On the other hand, the contract should restrict 
the contractor’s claiming right if the contractor does not require it 
to be granted. This is because the contractor realises that it is his 
responsibility and he is comfortable in taking the responsibility for 
this type of unfavourable effect.
In case the employers think the contractor’s right to claim for 
compensation should be restricted but the contractors do not 
think so, the data on risk premiums that employers are willing to 
pay (WTP) and that the contractors want (RP) are required for 
the decision on whether to restrict the contractor’s right to claim 
for compensation. In this situation, the decision on whether to 
grant or to restrict the contractor’s right to claim should be made 
based on a comparison of these two data. There certainly should 
be no restriction of the contractor’s right to claim if the premium 
that employers are willing to pay is less than the premium that 
contractors would like to get. This is because the restriction of the 
right will cost employers more what that they think is reasonable. 
On the other hand, if the premium that employers are willing to pay 
is more than the premium that contractors would like to get, the 
contractor’s right to claim should certainly be restricted. Restriction 
of the right will cost employers less than that which they expect to 
shoulder (Ward et al., 1991; Jergeas and Hartman, 1996; Downs 
and Kettle, 2008).
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review reveals insight on the attitude of contracting 
parties toward the responsibility for overall effect from undesirable 
events. Some examples of the research in this area are the studies 
by Kartam and Kartam (2001), Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
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(2002), Bing et al. (2004), ANDI (2006), El-Sayegh (2007), and 
Loosemore and McCarthy (2008). Although the results of the 
studies by these researchers fulfi l their objectives, the decision 
whether to grant or to restrict the contractor’s right to claim 
compensation for specifi c type of unfavourable effects from 
undesirable events could not be made. This is because the 
research in the past did not study the attitude of contracting parties 
towards each specifi c effect of undesirable events, such as the 
effect on project duration, the effect on direct cost and the effect on 
indirect cost.
There have been rather limited studies of risk premium. Some 
examples are the studies by Ashley et al. (1989), Akintoye and 
MacLeod (1997), Khan (1998), and Mohamed and Hartman 
(2000). The knowledge gained from these studies also cannot be 
used for considering whether to grant or to restrict the contractor’s 
right to claim for compensation for unfavourable effects due to 
undesirable events. This is because these researchers did not 
focus on the premium related to the restriction of the contractor’s 
right to claim for each specifi c effect from the undesirable events. 
Moreover, in most of the research studies in this area, such as 
the studies by Ashley et al. (1989) and by Akintoye and MacLeod 
(1997), a discrete rating scale was used. Therefore, the results of 
these research studies on risk premium that the employer is willing 
to pay or that the contractor wants to get could not be expressed 
numerically and could not be used for comparison.
As already mentioned, the data on the attitude of the contracting 
parties (i.e. employers and contractors) and the risk premium 
obtained from past research are not complete and cannot be used 
for considering whether to grant or to restrict the contractor’s right 
to claim compensation for unfavourable effects due to undesirable 
events. To obtain data that can be used for considering whether to 
grant or restrict contractor’s rights, further research is needed.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This study is a part of our whole research project that aims to 
propose an approach to improve the contract conditions of the 
standard contract of the Thai government. This standard contract 
form is used in most of the construction projects owned by the 
Thai government which is the biggest group of employers in the 
Thai construction industry. The Thai government’s annual budget 
for construction in the year 2009 is 166,000 million Baht. This 
equals about 50% of the total cost of construction for the whole 
country. This research project focuses on the responsibility of the 
contracting parties for the unfavourable effects from fi ve groups of 
events that normally initiate disputes between contracting parties 
in the Thai construction industry. These events are force majeures, 
employer’s ineffective functions, employer’s interference actions, 
different site conditions, and change in scope of work.
The primary objectives of this part of the project are to investigate 
the attitude of employers (Thai governmental organisations) 
towards the restriction of the contractor’s rights to claim 
compensation for unfavourable effects due to undesirable events 
and to determine the risk premium that they are willing to pay for 
the restriction. These data are required for considering whether the 
contractor’s right to claim for compensation should be restricted. 
By using data on the attitude of employers towards the restriction 
of the contractor’s right to claim for compensation, the types of 
the effect that employers are comfortable to take responsibility 
for themselves can be identifi ed. The types of contractor’s right to 
claim for compensation that certainly should not be restricted will 
then be known. On the other hand, data on the risk premium that 
the employer is willing to pay for the restriction of the contractor’s 
right to claim are also required for comparing the premium that the 
contractor wants when both contracting parties do not want to be 
responsible for an effect of an undesirable event. The secondary 
objective of this part of the study is to apply the knowledge gained 
from the study to a preliminary analysis of the inappropriateness 
of conditions related to the responsibility allocation in the standard 
contract of the Thai government1.
CHOICE-BASED CONJOINT ANALYSIS
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT CHOICE-BASED CONJOINT 
ANALYSIS
Choice-based conjoint analysis is one of the statistical techniques 
and methods that were designed to analyse the utility of each 
characteristic of each specifi c attribute of product. It is used 
in several research studies (Hartmann and Sattler, 2002; 
Sawtoothsoftware, 2007). Choice-based conjoint analysis is not 
only used in marketing research, but in other research such as 
environmental valuation. As for civil engineering, choice-based 
conjoint analysis is widely applied in transportation research. 
However, in the fi eld of construction and management, Sturts and 
Griffi s (2005) is the only study that applied choice-based conjoint 
analysis, in this case to calculate the probability of winning based 
on multiple factors.
The unique feature of choice-based conjoint analysis is that it 
does not require respondents to identify the degree of importance 
of each possible level of each specifi c attribute of the product. 
Instead, they are asked to express their preferences by choosing 
the most preferred product (service) – one choice out of a specifi ed 
choice set. Then, a multinomial logit model, developed based on 
random utility theory, is used to investigate all the utility data.
The independent variable that is used in developing a multinomial 
logit model is the total observable utility of each choice. It is the 
summation of the utility of each attribute of each choice, which can 
be expressed as shown in Equation (1).
Vi = β1i (X1i) + β2i (X2i) + β3i (X3i) + …… + βki (Xki) (1)
where:
Vi  is the observable utility for choice i
k  is the number of the attributes of the product/service
Xni  is the values of the attributes n of the choice i
βni  is the utility of the attributes n of the choice i
The multinomial logit model then is developed based on the 
probability of selecting each choice. The probability of an individual 
choosing choice i out of the choice set is equal to the ratio of the 
(exponential of the) utility of choice i to the sum of the (exponential 
of) utility of all choices in the choice set. The model of the 
probability of selecting each choice is presented in Equation (2).
      (2)
where:
 is the probability of an individual choosing choice i out of 
 the choice set
V(i) is the utility for choice i
J is the number of a choice in the choice set
C is the choice set that the respondent is asked to evaluate
1The complete analysis of the inappropriateness of the contract 
conditions will be reported later when data on the attitude of Thai 
contractors towards the restriction of the rights is obtained.
?
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Once the utility of each specifi c attribute of a product/service is 
estimated, the marginal rate of substitution between different 
attributes can be calculated. If one of the attributes is a monetary 
variable, the willingness of the respondent to pay for each specifi c 
attribute of the product/service can be calculated from Equation 
(3).
        
      (3)
where:
WTPn  is the monetary value that an individual is willing to pay
 for a unit change of attribute n
βn is the utility of attribute n
βPRI is the utility of monetary attributes 
A CHOICE-BASED CONJOINT ANALYSIS APPROACH 
TO STUDY THE ATTITUDES OF THAI GOVERNMENT 
ORGANISATIONS
The desire of the organisations to restrict each type of 
contractor’s right to claim for compensation and extra cost that the 
organisations are willing to pay for the restriction of each type of 
the contractor’s claiming right (WTP) are the two main results that 
are expected from the study of the attitudes of Thai government 
organisations toward the restriction of the contractor’s right to claim 
for compensation. Choice-based conjoint analysis is one of the 
most suitable statistical tools that can provide these two types of 
information. The utility value of the restriction of the claiming right 
and the utility value of the premium rate to be paid to a contractor 
of Thai government organisations can be determined from the 
multinomial model of the choice-based conjoint analysis assuming 
that the proposal related to restriction of the claiming right and 
paying the premium is the product, the attributes of the proposal 
are product attributes, and the characteristics of each specifi c 
attribute of the proposal are characteristic of specifi c product 
attributes. Figure 1 reveals an analogy with a consumer product, 
i.e. a dog food, with a proposal related to the restriction of the right 
to claim for compensation and the premium. 
Once the utility of the restriction of each type of contractor’s 
claiming right and that of the premium rate are estimated, the 
willingness of the organisations to restrict each type of the 
contractor’s claiming right can be identifi ed by examining the 
sign of their utility value. The WTP for restricting each type of 
contractor’s right can also be calculated from the comparison of 
the utility of restricting the right with the utility of paying a premium 
to the contractor. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
PROPOSED ATTITUDES AND CHARACTERISTICS
Generally, two types of fundamental information are required for 
designing a choice-based conjoint analysis study. These are the 
list of the product attributes and the list of the characteristics of 
each product attribute. For this research, to study the attitudes of 
the organisations toward the restriction of the contractor’s right 
to claim compensation for an unfavourable effect from the fi ve 
undesirable events, these two types of information, therefore, are 
the list of proposal attributes and the list of the characteristics of 
each proposal attribute.
The proposal to be studied here consists of six attributes. The 
fi rst fi ve attributes are conditions related to the restriction of the 
contractor’s right to claim compensation for unfavourable effects 
from the fi ve undesirable events. These fi ve events are the 
events that have effects on construction duration and contractor’s 
expense and normally initiate confl ict between contracting parties 
in the Thai construction industry. These fi ve groups of events are 
acquired from the study of three groups of documents namely: (1) 
the rulings of Thai Supreme Court between 1957 and 2001, (2) 
the decisions of the Offi ce of the Attorney General between 1957 
and 2001 and the decisions of the Regulatory Authorities on the 
Procurement Regulations of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce, and (3) 
seven standard contracts.
These fi ve events are (1) force majeure such as hurricane, 
fl ood, etc, (2) ineffective performances of employer such as 
delay in approval of submittal, (3) interference to the work by 
employer’s actions such as giving an order to suspend the project, 
or occupying the construction area within the site, (4) differing 
site conditions such as experiencing an existing underground 
foundation in the construction area, and (5) change in the scope 
of work such as the employer giving an order to increase the 
quantity of the work. The last attribute was a condition related 
to the premium rate that the organisations have to pay to the 
contractor to compensate for the restriction of the right to claim for 
compensation.
Figure 1: The attributes and the characteristics of an attribute of a dog 
food versus those of a proposal related to the restriction of the right to 
claim for compensation and the premium
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This research focused on three types of restrictions. The 
characteristics of the restrictions are as follows: (1) the restriction 
of contractor’s right to claim for an increase of direct cost, (2) the 
restriction of contractor’s right to claim for an increase of overhead 
cost, and (3) the restriction of contractor’s right to claim for an 
extension of construction duration. The four levels of the restriction 
of the right to claim compensation for unfavourable effects of each 
undesirable event were derived from the approaches widely used 
in the Thai construction industry. The detail of the combination 
of the these characteristics of restriction and the four levels of 
restriction are presented in Table 1. In this study, the premium rate 
was also categorized into four levels, ranging from 0.25% to 1.00% 
of the project direct cost. The full list of the premium rates and the 
characteristic of the premium rates are also presented in Table 1.
Table 1: List of the proposal attributes and the characteristic of each attribute
 
List of the attributes of the proposal Parameter representing 
the restriction/premium 
First attribute:  Restriction of contractor's right to claim compensation 
for unfavorable effect from force majeure 
 
First level: No restriction of contractor's claiming right  - 
Second level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost  
FORD 
Third level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost and an increase of overhead cost 
FORD, FORO 
Fourth level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost, an increase of overhead cost and an extension of 
construction duration  
FORD, FORO, FORT 
Second attribute:  Restriction of contractor's right to claim compensation 
for unfavorable effect from ineffective performance of 
employer 
 
First level: No restriction of contractor's claiming right  - 
Second level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost  
IEFD 
Third level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost and an increase of overhead cost 
IEFD, IEFO 
Fourth level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost, an increase of overhead cost and an extension of 
construction duration  
IEFD, IEFO, IEFT 
Third attribute:  Restriction of contractor's right to claim compensation 
for unfavorable effect from interference of the work by 
the employer’s action 
 
First level: No restriction of contractor's claiming right - 
Second level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost 
???? 
Third level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost and an increase of overhead cost 
????, ???? 
Fourth level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost, an increase of overhead cost and an extension of 
construction duration  
????, ????, ???? 
Fourth attribute: Restriction of contractor's right to claim compensation 
for unfavorable effect from differing site condition 
 
First level: No restriction of the contractor's claiming right  - 
Second level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost  
DIFO 
Third level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost and an increase of overhead cost  
DIFD, DIFO 
Fourth level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost, an increase of overhead cost and an extension of 
construction duration  
DIFD, DIFO, DIFT 
Fifth attribute: Restriction of contractor's right to claim compensation 
for unfavorable effect from change in scope of work 
 
First level: No restriction of the contractor's claiming right  - 
Second level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost  
CHAO 
Third level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
construction duration  
CHAT 
Fourth level: Restriction of contractor's right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost and an extension of construction duration  
CHAO, CHAT 
Sixth attribute:  Premium rate that the organisation has to pay to 
contractor 
PRE 
First level: 1.00 % of total project direct cost  
Second level: 0.75 % of total project direct cost  
Third level: 0.50 % of total project direct cost  
Fourth level: 0.25 % of total project direct cost  
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QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
The development of the questionnaire began with determining the 
number of proposals to be considered. Since there are 4 levels of 
condition for each proposal attribute, a total of 46 = 4,096 proposals 
can be developed. It was seemingly impossible to ask respondents 
to evaluate such large number of proposals; therefore, fractional 
factorial design was used to reduce the number of hypothetical 
proposals to be evaluated by respondents. To ensure that 
100% D-effi ciency would be acquired, SAS ver. 9.0 was used to 
determine the number of proposals and to develop the proposal. 
The results from mktrun in SAS revealed that the appropriate 
number of proposals is 48. All 48 proposals were, then, developed 
by mktex in SAS. 
To develop the multinomial logit model, it is necessary that 
the number of available equations is more than the number 
of parameters. In this research, there are 15 (3*4+2+1) utility 
parameters. Therefore, all of the 48 proposals are paired up to be 
24 choice sets. These provide 24 equations that are more than the 
number of utility parameters, which is 15. However, it is taken into 
account that the respondents may feel uninterested and become 
inattentive when asked to evaluate a large number of choice sets. 
This feeling may have affect responses (Hensher et al. 2005). To 
avoid any errors due to this attitude, the 24 choice sets are divided 
into two groups. Each group consists of 12 choice sets and each 
respondent is asked to respond only to one group. An example 
of a choice set presented to the respondents to identify the most 
preferred proposal is presented in Figure 2.
SAMPLES FOR THE STUDY AND THE SURVEY CONCERNING 
ATTITUDES OF THAI GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
To gather the data on the attitudes of Thai government 
organisations toward restriction of contractor’s right to claim for 
compensation, the questionnaire survey was conducted during 
June 2008 to August 2008. Selected samples for the study are 
the individuals who represent Thai government organisations 
on construction projects. Those who worked for engineering 
consultant companies and hired by Thai government organisations 
are also included in the study sample. Information about the 
organisations, the number of their personnel to whom the 
questionnaires were distributed, and the number of respondents is 
presented in Table 2.
The total number of returned questionnaires that met the criteria 
for inclusion in this research is 317. This is more than the minimum 
required response. According to the Rich Johnson formula (Orme, 
2006), the minimum number of respondents required is 84, as 
given by Equation (4). 
        
      (4)
where:
n  is minimum number of respondent
t  is number of choice set
a  is number of choice in each choice set
c  is number of level of each attribute
 
Choice set 1 
Conditions related to the restriction of contractor's right to 
claim compensation for unfavorable effect from each event 
 First 
proposal 
 Second 
proposal 
An increase of direct cost  Restriction  Restriction 
An increase of overhead cost  Restriction  No restriction Force majeure  
such as hurricane, flood, etc. An extension of construction 
duration 
  No restriction  No restriction 
An increase of direct cost  Restriction  No restriction 
An increase of overhead cost  Restriction  No restriction 
Ineffective performances of 
employer 
such as delay in approval  
of submittal 
An extension of construction 
duration 
 No restriction  No restriction 
An increase of direct cost  Restriction  No restriction 
An increase of overhead cost  Restriction  No restriction 
Interference with the work by 
employer’s actions such as 
project suspension order 
An extension of construction 
duration 
 Restriction  No restriction 
An increase of direct cost  Restriction  No restriction 
An increase of overhead cost  Restriction  No restriction 
Differing site conditions  
such as experiencing an 
existing underground 
foundation 
An extension of construction 
duration 
 No restriction  No restriction 
An increase of direct cost  No restriction  No restriction 
An increase of overhead cost  Restriction  No restriction Change in scope of work  
such as additional work order An extension of construction 
duration 
 No restriction  Restriction 
Premium rate that has to be paid to the contractor  0.25%  0.75% 
 
 First 
proposal  
Second 
proposal 
Please identify your most preferred proposal of the two by 
marking X in the block 
    
Figure 2: Example of choice set presented to respondents
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RESULTS OF THE STUDY AND DISCUSSION 
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL AND THE UTILITY PARAMETERS
In this research, there are a total of 15 utility parameters that 
need to be evaluated. Those parameters are 14 utility parameters 
related to restriction of the contractor’s rights and one other 
parameter related to the premium rate. The multinomial logit model 
as presented in Equation (5) is developed by applying the program 
SAS.
V(i) =  βFORD (FORD) + βFORO (FORO) + βFORT (FORT) +
 βIEFD (IEFD) + βIEFO (IEFO) + βIEFT (IEFT) +
  βINTD (INTD) + βINTO (INTO) + βINTT (INTT) +
 βDIFD (DIFD) + βDIFO (DIFO) + βDIFT (DIFT) +
 βCHAO (CHAO) + βCHAT (CHAT) + βPRE (PRE) (5)
The value of each of the 15 utility parameters, which is developed 
based on the response rate for each choice, is presented in Table 
3.
THE ATTITUDE OF THAI GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS 
TOWARDS THE RESTRICTION OF THE CONTRACTOR’S 
RIGHT TO CLAIM COMPENSATION
The plus or minus sign of the utility parameter refl ects the attitude 
of the respondents. A plus sign indicates that the respondents 
prefer that type of attribute characteristic. A minus sign indicates 
that the respondents do not prefer that type of attribute 
characteristic. Therefore, in this research, the attitude of Thai 
government organisations can be interpreted from the sign of each 
utility parameter.
The sign of each utility parameter in Table 3 reveals that there 
are six types of contractor’s right to claim for compensation that 
Thai government organisations would like to restrict. Of these six 
types, two of them are related to force majeure. These are the 
right to claim for an increase of direct cost and an increase of 
overhead cost. One of them is related to employer’s ineffective 
performances: the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost. 
Moreover, two of them are related to employer’s interference 
actions. These are the right to claim for an increase of direct cost 
and an increase of overhead cost. Lastly, the remaining one is 
related to differing site conditions; it is the right to claim for an 
increase of overhead cost.
On the other hand, according to data in Table 3, there were 8 types 
of contactor’s claiming right that Thai government organisations 
did not want to restrict. Of these eight types of right, one is 
related to force majeure: it is the right to claim for an extension 
of construction duration. Two of them are related to employer’s 
ineffective performances: the right to claim for an increase of direct 
cost and an extension of construction duration. One of them is 
related to employer’s interference actions: the right to claim for 
an extension of construction duration. Two of them are related to 
differing site conditions: the right to claim for an increase of direct 
cost and an extension of construction duration. The last two are 
related to change in scope of the work: the right to claim for an 
increase of the overhead cost and an extension of construction 
duration.
Based on data from the analysis, it appears that Thai government 
organisations are less concerned about extension of the 
construction duration. The results of the study reveal that the 
organisations did not mind granting the contractor’s right to claim 
for the extension of construction duration in all fi ve cases. This 
could be because the government organisations have more 
fl exibility and probably less “urgency” as to their “commencement 
of use” of the project than private organisations. On the other hand, 
Thai government organisations tend to pay much more attention 
to extra cost. Based on data from the analysis, Thai government 
organisations agreed to pay only an increase of direct cost due 
to employer’s ineffective performance, differing site conditions, 
and change in scope of work. These study results refl ect the 
willingness of the representatives of government organisations 
to follow the regulation of the Thai government that encourages 
them to manage projects within budget limits and prohibits them 
from requesting extra budget. They also refl ect the intention of the 
organisations to avoid disputes with contractors that might occur 
during the assessment of the actual expense due to an event.
THE ATTITUDE OF THAI GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS 
TOWARD THE CONTRACTOR’S PREMIUM
As shown in Table 3, the utility value of paying a contractor’s 
premium was less than zero. It indicates that increasing the 
contractor’s premium will make the organisations unhappy. This 
information conforms to the fact that employers prefer not to pay 
high premiums to contractors.
 
No Type of 
organisation 
 No. of organizations: No. of personnel: No. of surveys: 
   to which 
surveys 
were 
distributed 
responding 
to survey 
to which 
surveys 
were 
distributed  
responding 
to survey 
that met the 
criteria  
1. Public university 23 17 60 32 32 
2. Division of highway 
department 
54 50 253 144 137 
3. Division of irrigation 
department 
10 9 40 23 23 
4. Local administration 
unit 
64 53 198 98 97 
5. Construction 
consulting company 
40 15 123 30 28 
 
Total 191 144 674 327 317 
 
Table 2: List of the proposal attributes and the characteristic of each 
attribute
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RANKING THE PREFERENCE OF THAI GOVERNMENT 
ORGANISATIONS FOR THE RESTRICTION OF EACH TYPE OF 
CONTRACTOR’S RIGHT
The level of preference of the respondents for each characteristic 
of product attributes can be evaluated from the value of utility 
parameter related to them. The ranking of willingness of Thai 
government organisations to restrict each type of contractor’s 
claiming right, then, can be performed by comparing the value of 
the related parameters. High values of utility parameter reveal that 
Thai government organisations are eager to restrict that type of 
contractor’s right to claim for compensation. 
The types of contractor’s claiming right that Thai government 
organisations would like to restrict can be ranked according to the 
level of the willingness to restrict as shown in Table 4.
THE WILLINGNESS OF THAI GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS 
TO PAY FOR THE RESTRICTION OF THE CONTRACTOR’S 
RIGHT TO CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION
Table 5 presents Thai government organisations willingness to 
pay for the restriction of six types of the contractor’s right to claim 
for compensation (WTP). These six types of contractor’s right to 
claim for compensation are the types of contractor’s rights that 
the organisations would like to restrict. WTP is presented in terms 
 
Parameter Description of the parameter Value 
?FORD Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost due to force majeure 
0.224 
?FORO Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost due to force majeure 
0.176 
?FORT Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an extension 
of construction duration due to force majeure 
-0.713 
?IEFD Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost due to employer's ineffective performances 
-0.005 
?IEFO Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost due to employer's ineffective 
performances  
0.096 
?IEFT Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an extension 
of construction duration due to employer's ineffective 
performances  
-0.105 
?INTD Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost due to employer’s interference actions 
0.093 
?INTO Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost due to employer’s interference actions 
0.141 
?INTT Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an extension 
of construction duration due to employer’s interference 
actions 
-0.118 
?DIFD Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
direct cost due to differing site conditions 
-0.159 
?DIFO Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost due to differing site conditions 
0.213 
?DIFT Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an extension 
of construction duration due to differing site conditions 
-0.022 
?CHAO Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an increase of 
overhead cost due to change in scope of work 
-0.087 
?CHAT Utility of restriction of the right to claim for an extension 
of construction duration due to change in scope of work 
-0.041 
?PRE Utility of paying premium rate as a proportion to the total 
project direct cost.  
-1.070 
Table 3: Value of each utility parameter related to the restriction of the contractor’s right 
to claim for compensation and the premium rate
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of percentages of the total project direct cost. These values were 
determined by applying Equation (3). The WTP values in Table 5 
reveal that the organisations are willing to pay between 0.087%-
0.210% of the total project direct cost to restrict each type of the 
contractor’s right. The total extra cost that the organisations are 
willing to pay to compensate for the restriction of all the six types of 
contractor’s right to claim is 0.882%.
ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF THE 
THAI GOVERNMENT 
In this section, the standard contract of the Thai government, 
known as “the sample contract annexed to the procurement 
regulation of the Prime Minister’s offi ce”, was analysed on the 
knowledge gained from the choice-based conjoint analysis 
experiment. This contract form is used in most projects owned by 
Thai government organisations and state enterprises.
Of the ten types of right to claim for compensation, the standard 
contract of the Thai government mentions seven. Clause 11 of 
the contract restricts the contractor’s right to claim for an increase 
of direct cost and overhead cost due to force majeure. Clause 
16 of the contract allows the contractor to claim for an extension 
of construction duration and an increase of overhead cost due 
to change in scope of work. Clause 22 of the contract allows 
the contractor to claim for an extension of construction duration 
due to force majeure, an extension of construction duration due 
to the employer’s ineffective performances and an extension of 
construction duration due to the employer’s interference actions.
Regarding the other seven types of right not included in the 
contract, it can be assumed that these types of right are restricted 
by the contract. This assumption is based on the fact that, by 
nature, the representatives of Thai government organisations 
will not allow the contractor to claim for compensation if there is 
no clear clause in the contract granting the right to claim to the 
contractor. In addition, Thai constructors tend to avoid a litigation 
process against the Thai government because they do not want 
to be blacklisted by the Thai government which as a consequence 
could bar them from participating on future Thai government 
projects.
 
Ranking Description  
1 the right to claim for an increase of direct cost due to force majeure 
2 the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to differing site 
conditions 
3 the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to force majeure 
4 the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to employer’s 
interference actions 
5 the right to claim for an increase of direct cost due to employer’s 
interference actions 
6 the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to employer's 
ineffective performances 
 
Table 4: Ranking of the claiming rights by the level of willingness of Thai 
government organisations to restrict
 
Description WTP 
Restriction of the right to claim for an increase of direct cost due to force 
majeure 
0.210 
Restriction of the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to force 
majeure 
0.164 
Restriction of the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to 
employer's ineffective performances 
0.090 
Restriction of the right to claim for an increase of direct cost due to 
employer’s interference actions 
0.087 
Restriction of the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to 
employer’s interference actions 
0.132 
Restriction of the right to claim for an increase of overhead cost due to 
differing site conditions 
0.199 
 
Table 5: Willingness of Thai government organizations to pay for the restriction of 
each type of the contractor’s right to claim for compensation
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The following are the results of the study on the comparison of 
the contractor’s right to claim for compensation according to the 
standard contract of the Thai government with the attitude of Thai 
government organisations from this research study:
1. The restriction of the contractor’s right to claim for an increase 
of direct cost and an increase of overhead cost due to force 
majeure in clause 11 is consistent with the attitude of Thai 
government organisations that want to restrict such rights.
2. The granting of fi ve types of the contractor’s claiming right 
in Clause 16 and Clause 22 is consistent with the attitude 
of Thai government organisations that do not want to 
restrict such rights. These rights are (1) the right to claim 
for an extension of construction duration due to change 
in scope of work, (2) the right to claim for an extension of 
construction duration due to force majeure, (3) the right 
to claim for an extension of construction duration due to 
employer’s ineffective performances, (4) the right to claim 
for an extension of construction duration due to employer’s 
interference actions, and (5) the right to claim for an increase 
of overhead cost due to change in scope of work.
3. The silence of the contract on the contractor’s right to claim 
for four types of effect, which imply the restriction of the 
contractor’s claiming rights, is consistent with the attitude 
of Thai government organisations that want to restrict such 
rights. These four types of effects are (1) an increase of 
direct cost due to the employer’s interference actions, (2) an 
increase of overhead cost due to the employer’s ineffective 
performance, (3) an increase of overhead cost due to the 
employer’s interference actions, and (4) an increase of 
overhead cost due to differing site condition.
4. The silence of the contract on the contractor’s right to claim 
for three types of the effect, which imply the restriction of the 
contractor’s claiming rights, is not consistent with the attitude 
of Thai government organisations that do not want to restrict 
such rights. These effects are an extension of construction 
duration, an increase of direct cost due to differing site 
conditions and an increase of direct cost due to employer’s 
ineffective performances.
From the comparison, it can be concluded that granting or 
restricting each type of the contractor’s right to claim compensation 
for unfavourable effects from undesirable events in the standard 
contract of the Thai government contract are mostly consistent 
with the attitude of Thai government organisations. There are only 
three types of contractor’s right to claim for compensation that Thai 
government organisations did not want to be restricted, for which 
the contract does not grant such a right. These three types of right 
are the right to claim for an extension of construction duration, 
an increase of direct cost due to differing site conditions, and an 
increase of direct cost due to employer’s ineffective performances. 
This inappropriateness may cause Thai government organisations 
to be charged unnecessarily high risk premiums by contractors.
CONCLUSION
This research reveals the potential of applying choice-based 
conjoint analysis in construction engineering and management 
research, and more specifi cally the use of choice-based conjoint 
analysis to study the attitude of construction people towards the 
restriction of the contractor’s right to claim for compensation. In 
this study, choice-based conjoint analysis was applied to study 
the attitude of Thai government organisations. The study focused 
on their attitudes towards the restriction of the contractor’s right 
to claim compensation for unfavourable effects from fi ve types of 
undesirable events. These events are force majeure, ineffective 
performances of employer, interference of the work by the 
employer’s actions, differing site conditions, and change in scope 
of work.
Results of the study reveal the attitude of Thai government 
organisations towards the restriction of the contractor’s right to 
claim for compensation as follows: (1) the organisations want 
to restrict the contractor’s right to claim for an increase of direct 
cost in two cases, force majeure and interference in the work 
by employer’s actions, (2) the organisations prefer to restrict 
the contractor’s right to claim for an increase of overhead cost 
in all cases except for change in scope of work, and (3) the 
organisations did not want to restrict the contractor’s right to claim 
for the extension of construction duration in all fi ve cases.
This fi nding is useful for considering whether to grant or to restrict 
each type of the contractor’s right to claim for compensation. 
Based on the data from this study, the contract between Thai 
government organisations and contractors should not restrict eight 
types of the contactor’s right that Thai government organisations 
did not want to restrict. This study also reveals the rank of 
preference of the organisations for the restriction of each type of 
the contractor’s claiming right. Of the six types of right, the right 
that the organisations want to restrict the most is the contractor’s 
right to claim for an increase of direct cost due to force majeure. 
Moreover, the premium that the organisations are willing to pay 
for the restriction of the contractor’s claiming rights, in terms of the 
total project direct cost, is also reported. The total extra cost that 
the organisations are willing to pay for restricting all the six types 
of contractor’s right to claim for compensation is 0.882%. The extra 
cost that the organisations are willing to pay for the restriction of 
each type of right ranges between 0.087% and 0.210% of the total 
project direct cost. The data is necessary for considering whether 
to grant or to restrict the contractor’s right to claim in the case that 
the organisations want to restrict such a right but the contractors 
do not want it to be restricted.
In addition, the data on the attitude of the organisations that was 
obtained from the choice-based conjoint analysis experiment was 
used to analyse the appropriateness of the standard contract of 
Thai government. The analysis reveals three types of contractor’s 
right to claim for compensation that Thai government organisations 
did not want to restrict, for which the contract does not grant such 
a right. This inappropriateness of the contract may cause Thai 
government organisations to be charged unnecessarily high risk 
premiums by contractors.
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